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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Mr. Widmyer has established an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
A. Idaho Code § 19-2524 does limit the ability of a court to impose as a condition of 
misdemeanor probation a requirement that the offender submit to a psychosexual 
evaluation. 
II. Mr. Widmyer has demonstrated that his sentence is illegal, was imposed in an illegal 
manner and was imposed for Mr. Widmyer asserting his Fifth Amendment rights. 
A. The probation requiring Mr. Widmyer submit to a psychosexual evaluation and 
polygraph violates Mr. Widmyer's right against self-incrimination. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Widmyer has established an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
A. Idaho Code § 19-2524 does limit the ability of a court to impose as a condition of 
misdemeanor probation a requirement that the offender submit to a psychosexual 
evaluation. 
The government claims that Idaho Code § 19-2524 "prescribes the circumstances in 
which a trial court must order substance abuse or mental health evaluations in a felony case." 
(Respondent's brief, p.16.) However the text ofLC. § 19-2524 is as follows, 
When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a felony, or when a 
defendant who has been convicted of a felony has admitted to or been found to have 
committed a violation of a condition of probation, the court, prior to the sentencing 
hearing or the hearing on revocation of probation, may order the defendant to undergo a 
substance abuse assessment and/or a mental health examination. Idaho Code Ann. § 19-
2524 (West). 
The text of the statute shows the plain meaning is to allow for a court to order a 
psychosexual evaluation for certain felons if the court so wishes. The Webster Dictionary 
provides four definitions of the verb "may". The definitions which apply here include "liberty", 
"permission", and "possibility." (http://www.webster-dictionary.net/definitionlmay).An 
analysis of the law based on the plain meaning shows the court is not required to order a 
psychosexual evaluation but is given permission by the legislature to request such an evaluation 
for celiain felons if the court desires. 
A review of the legislative history confirms that the intent of this law was to allow a 
psychosexual evaluation to be ordered for certain felons. The Statement of Purpose for the 
legislation states, "The legislation allows a judge to order a substance abuse assessment and/or a 
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mental health examination for certain convicted felons and felony parole violators that appear 
before the court." (STATEMENT OF PURPOSE RS 16969Cl). 
In light of the text of the statute and the legislative history the court did not have the 
authority to order a psychosexual examination in this case; thereby acted outside the bounds of 
discretion and not consistently with the applicable legal standards and abused its discretion by 
ordering the psychosexual evaluation for Mr. Widmyer, a man convicted of a misdemeanor. 
II. Mr. Widmyer has demonstrated that his sentence is illegal, was imposed in an illegal 
manner and was imposed for Mr. Widmyer asserting his Fifth Amendments Rights. 
A. The probation condition requiring Mr. Widmyer submit to a psychosexual 
evaluation and polygraph violates Mr. Widmyer's right against self-incrimination. 
The government claims that Mr. Widmyer's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated 
when he was ordered to either submit to a psychosexual evaluation or go straight to jail. The 
government cites Minnesota v Murphy and State v Crowe in support of its claim that a state may 
insist as a condition of probation on compelling answers to incriminating questions. 
In Murphy, the defendant pled guilty to a sex-related charge and was placed on probation. 
He was then questioned by his probation officer about other sex crimes. The defendant sought to 
have his statements to the probation officer suppressed on the grounds that his Fifth Amendment 
rights were violated. In Murphy the Supreme Court held that the defendant may be required to 
answer questions as long as the answers are not used in criminal proceedings against him. 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). 
In Crowe the Idaho Supreme Court held that admission ofthe defendant's statements to 
his sex offender counselor that he had fondled his niece's buttocks, in violation of his probation 
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agreement, did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. State v. Crowe, 
131 Idaho 109,952 P.2d 1245 (1998). 
In 2002 the Supreme Court of the United States in McKune v Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 122 S. Ct. 
2017, a plurality decision found that adverse consequences faced by a state prisoner for refusing 
to make admissions required for participation in sexual abuse treatment program were not so 
severe as to amount to compelled self-incrimination. However, Justice O'Connor in a concurring 
opinion stated that she agreed with the plurality that the defendant Lile's reduction in prison 
privileges and his transfer to a maximum security prison were not penalties sufficiently serious to 
compel testimony. Id. at 50. She did not however, agree with the plurality on how they 
distinguished cases with more serious penalties. She stated: 
I believe the proper theory should recognize that it is generally acceptable to impose the 
risk of punishment, however great, so long as the actual imposition of such punishment is 
accomplished through a fair criminal process. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, supra, 
at 213,91 S.Ct. 1454 ("The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete 
with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow. 
Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow 
whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid 
requiring him to choose" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted». Forcing 
defendants to accept such consequences seems to me very different from imposing 
penalties for the refusal to incriminate oneself that go beyond the criminal process and 
appear, starkly, as government attempts to compel testimony. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 
24,53, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2035, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002). 
The Ninth Circuit in 2005 relying on McKune found that a provision of a defendant's 
supervised release, requiring him to successfully complete sexual abuse treatment program, 
violated his right against self-incrimination. us. v. Antelope, 395 F, 3d 1128 (2005). In 
Antelope the defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 
five years probation with the requirement that he attend Sexual Abuse Behavior Evaluation and 
Recovery (SABER) which would subject him to polygraphs and a full sexual history 
autobiography. He challenged this requirement asserting the Fifth Amendment. His probation 
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was revoked for failure to comply with the conditions of probation when he refused to take the 
required polygraph. 
The Ninth Circuit in Antelope started its analysis with the Constitution - the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." U.S. Constitution amendment V. The court further stated, "This right 
remains available to Antelope despite his conviction. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 
426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) ("A defendant does not lose this protection by 
reason of his conviction of a crime .... "); cf McKune v. Life, 536 U.S. 24, 48-54, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 
153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in 4-1-4 decision) (applying the full-blown 
Fifth Amendment analysis to a prisoner's claim that the prison's requirement that he participate in 
a sex offender treatment program violated his constitutional right" United States v. Antelope, 
395 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2005). 
To establish a Fifth Amendment claim the defendant must prove two things (1) that the 
testimony desired by the government carried the risk of incrimination and (2) that the penalty the 
defendant suffered amounted to compulsion. Id. at 1134. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege is only properly invoked in the face of a real and 
appreciable danger of self-incrimination. Id. As a general rule Fifth Amendment rights are not 
trumped by countervailing government interests, such as criminal rehabilitation. Id. at 1135. In 
Antelope the court found the risk of incrimination was real and appreciable because part of the 
program he was required to attend included that he reveal his full sexual history which would be 
checked as to accuracy with a polygraph. The court said, "Based on the nature of this 
requirement and Antelope's steadfast refusal to comply, it seems only fair to infer that his sexual 
autobiography would, in fact, reveal past sex crimes. Such an inference would be consistent with 
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the belief of Roger Dowty, Antelope's SABER counselor, who suspects Antelope of having 
committed prior sex offenses. The treatment condition placed Antelope at a crossroads-comply 
and incriminate himself or invoke his right against self-incrimination and be sent to prison. We 
therefore conclude that Antelope's successful participation in SABER triggered a real danger of 
self-incrimination, not simply a remote or speculative threat." Id 
Similarly, Mr. Widmyer was ordered to participate in a psychosexual evaluation and 
polygraph test as a condition of his probation. He refused. The government's interest in 
rehabilitation does not trump Mr. Widmyer's Fifth Amendment right. In Antelope, the court 
surmised that a refusal to comply would infer past crimes which would be consistent with the 
counselor's opinion. Likewise, the judge in Mr. Widmyer's case said he heard the testimony 
and, despite no conviction in two previous trials of Mr. Widmyer the judge stated that Mr. 
Widmyer's behavior "had a huge impact on the other families." The judge suspected Mr. 
Widmyer of committing prior offenses just as the counselor in Antelope suspected that 
defendant. Thus, the condition that Mr. Widmyer submit to a psychosexual evaluation placed 
Mr. Widmyer at a crossroads similar to the defendant in the Antelope case - comply and 
potentially incriminate himself or invoke his right against self-incrimination and be sent to 
prison. Therefore, Mr. Widmyer's participation in a psychosexual evaluation places him in a 
real danger of self-incrimination, not simply a remote or speculative threat. 
The second prong ofthe self-incrimination inquiry asks whether the government has 
sought to "impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment 
right not to give incriminating testimony against himself." Id Only "some penalties are so great 
as to 'compel' such testimony, while others do not rise to that level." McKune, 536 U.S. at 49, 
122 S.Ct. 2017 (O'Connor, 1., conculTing). In Antelope the Ninth Circuit found that the Court's 
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Court's decision in McKune required them to conclude that the penalty was so great as to rise to 
the level of compulsion. Antelope at 1136. The court noted: 
"Justice O'Connor made clear in her McKune concurrence that she would not have found 
a penalty of "longer incarceration" such as that here to be constitutionally permissible. Id. 
at 52, 122 S.Ct. 2017. The strength of Justice O'Connor's opinion as precedent is 
reinforced because it seems certain that the four dissenters in McKune, who argued that a 
loss of discretionary privileges and a transfer to less desirable living quarters under 
similar circumstances were sufficiently compulsive to violate Lile's privilege against self-
incrimination, would find a Fifth Amendment violation where the district court revoked 
Antelope's conditional liberty and sentenced him to an additional ten months in prison? 
On the basis of McKune, we hold that Antelope's privilege against self-incrimination was 
violated because Antelope was sentenced to a longer prison term for refusing to comply 
with SABER's disclosure requirements. Antelope at 1138. 
In the same way Mr. Widmyer faced a penalty of longer incarceration ifhe refused to submit to 
the psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in 
McKune the Court is asked to find that Mr. Widmyer's penalty rises to the level of compulsion, 
and accordingly remand for resentencing. 
DATED this _' __ day of July, 2013. 
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